An official estimate of the danger was given to the nation by
President Roosevelt in a radio address on 9 December.3 The Chief
Executive admitted that the losses at Pearl Harbor constituted a
serious setback and bluntly told the people to prepare for a long
war against powerful foes. he warned that the initial attack
could be repeated "at any one of many points in both oceans and
along our coast lines and against the rest of the hemisphere."
Summing up the terrible lesson which had been contained in the
rain of bombs on American ships and planes in the Pacific, the
President suggested that it ought to be clear to every citizen
"that our ocean-girt hemisphere is not immune from severe
attack–that we cannot measure our safety in terms of miles on
any map." At the same time, Mr. Roosevelt outlined views which
were to be reiterated through the discouraging months of the
first half-year of disaster and retreat, namely, that although
the country might be attacked, nothing must deter the nation from
its principal job of preparing to take the war to the enemy.

The prompt severance of the projected ferry route by way of
Koepang, Kendari, and Tarakan left our pursuit forces on Luzon
wholly dependent upon water shipment for reinforcement, with the
result that only three P-40′s reached the Philippines through the
long weeks preceding the fall of Corregidor in May. These had
been shipped in crates from Australia to Mindanao, where early in
March they were

ndeed, the only surprising thing about the appearance of the
enemy in U.S. coastal waters was that it took the U-boats nearly
a month to become active there after our entry into the war. Adm.
Karl Doenitz, who more than any one else in the German High
Command was in a position to know the submarine situation, has
since explained this delay by the fact that the Japanese attack
on Pearl Harbor came as a surprise to Germany’s political and
military leaders. Hitherto, U-boat commanders had been restrained
for political reasons from operating in American waters; and when
the declaration of war removed those restraints, no submarines
were immediately available for operations in the American coastal
area. In December it proved possible to send out only six
equipped for this purpose

A major preoccupation at all levels of the Eighth during the
spring was training. In the operational training units (OTU) of
the Second and Third Air Forces, intensive effort marked the
preparation of planes and crews for projected movement across the
Atlantic. Orders directed that particular attention be paid the
problems of rendezvous between bombers and fighters, for Generals
Arnold and Spaatz already had established the policy that
fighters of the Eighth Air Force would be used primarily for
escort of its bombers.30 Ground crews received their training on
the job mainly, though some individuals were sent to technical
schools for special training

Curiously enough, the first American unit to achieve operational
status and to engage in combat was neither a heavy bomber nor a
fighter outfit but a squadron of light bombers, the only one of
its kind among the U.S. forces then in the United Kingdom. The
15th Bombardment Squadron (Separate), commanded by Maj. J.L.
Griffith, had arrived in the theater in May 1942 and immediately
had been set to training on American-built Bostons belonging to
RAF No. 226 Squadron. The British contributed even more to the
training of this than to the other American units. Through
lectures and direct instruction, they gave the AAF pilots the
benefit of their long experience in conducting light bomber
missions. Gunners were sent to the RAF gunnery flight for courses
in gunnery and combat technique, and the ground crews were sent
to RAF stations to observe maintenance methods. By the latter
part of June, a number of crews had progressed far enough,
especially in pilotage, to be considered combat worthy

France, 1944…

Rob

Rob

Rob

Rob

Rob